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The extent to which China’s family planning policy has driven its fertility transi-
tion over the past decades is debatable. The disagreement is partly sourced from the
different ways of measuring the policy. Most existing measures, constructed on the
policy history, generally, do not include complete secular and cross-sectional policy
variations, fail to heterogeneously reflect people’s exposure to the policy, and often
suffer from endogeneity. This paper reviews the entire history of China’s family
planning policy and accordingly, proposes a new policy measure that integrates the
policy variations more completely, heterogeneously, and exogenously by using the
cross-sectional data of the China Health and Nutrition Survey. The new measure es-
timates the effect of policy on fertility and generates negative regression coefficients
that well reproduce the history. As for the contribution of the policy to fertility
transition, the measure explains a sizable level shift of fertility for major cohorts,
but only accounts for a small portion of the fertility decline over generations. In
addition, a more-educated woman, a woman residing in a better-developed coastal
province, or a woman whose first child is a son tends to desire fewer children and
thus, receives lighter pressure from the policy. Other than fertility, a woman would
delay her marriage in response to the policy, particularly when it is strongly enforced.
Finally, the paper shows that using an incomplete measure could systematically un-
derestimate the effect of policy on fertility and adopting an endogenous measure or
a measure lacking heterogeneity could even produce a positive effect of the policy.
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1 Introduction
China’s total fertility rate (TFR), a measure of the number of children born through
a woman’s life, has dropped from about six to below two during the last half-century.
Meanwhile, China has been enforcing family planning policies (FPP), which intend to
control the size of population, since 1960s.
The contribution made by FPP to China’s fertility transition is debatable. Many papers
concluded that FPP explained a sizable portion of China’s fertility decline, including
Lavely and Freedman (1990), Yang and Chen (2004), and Li et al. (2005). However,
other studies argued that the impact of FPP on fertility had been overstated (Schultz
and Zeng (1995), McElroy and Yang (2000), Narayan and Peng (2006), and Cai (2010)).
Such discord may have originated from the use of disparate data, various empirical strate-
gies and, more essentially, different ways of measuring FPP. Other than the direct effect
on fertility, different measures also generate various second-stage results in studies that
have used FPP to instrument fertility, sex ratio, etc. (Li and Zhang (2007), Li and
Zhang (2008), Edlund et al. (2008), Qian (2009), Banerjee et al. (2010), Islam and Smyth
(2010), and Wu and Li (2011)). Therefore, a reliable result of policy evaluation and
relevant studies requires the appropriate measurement of FPP.
Most studies constructed the measure of FPP according to its history, which is shown in
Section 2. Over time, FPP has experienced four periods: the period without FPP (1949–
1963), the period with mild and narrowly implemented FPP (1963–1971), the period with
strong and widely enforced FPP (1971–1980), and the period with the strictest one-child
policy (1980–present). The strength and enforcement of FPP differ between urban and
rural areas and vary from the ethnic majority, known as Hans, to the minority, denoted
by non-Hans. Based upon the historical policy variations over periods and across groups,
most studies assembled easily obtainable variables, such as birth year, living area, and
ethnicity, to create a measure of FPP.
However, most of such constructed measures are inaccurate. First, they focus on a portion
of the history of FPP and fail to completely utilize the policy variations. Second, the
constructed measures are sometimes endogenous and may bias the estimations. Third,
most measures fail to heterogenize people’s exposure to FPP so that intuitively different
policy exposures could be improperly assigned the same value for measurement. Section
3 offers a more detailed review of existing measures.
This paper tries to construct a new measure that is more complete, exogenous, and
heterogeneous. The “completeness” means integrating the secular and cross-sectional
policy variations as completely as possible. Furthermore, the measure is produced with
relatively exogenous variables such as birth year, survey year, urban dummy, and Han
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dummy. Finally, the heterogeneity of the measure is inspired by the intuition that a
woman’s exposure to FPP, i.e., the measure of FPP for a woman, deserves a greater
value if her exposure time is longer or if she is more physiologically likely to bear a child
during the policy period. The heterogeneity will be technically built on the probabil-
ity distribution of childbearing age. Section 4 provides the step-by-step procedure of
constructing the measure of FPP.
This paper uses the cross-sectional data of the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) to generate the new measure and accordingly, estimates the impact of FPP
on fertility. The regression coefficients of FPP are, generally, negative and statistically
significant. Moreover, the derived partial effect of FPP on fertility, robust to various
specifications, well reproduces the history of FPP, and thus, justifies the measurement.
According to the regression results, this paper further evaluates the contribution of FPP
to China’s fertility transition; without FPP, the fertility level of major cohorts, cohorts
1943–1960, would shift up by over 50% on average, but the over-generation decline of
fertility would only be a bit slower than the scenario with FPP. Sections 5.1 to 5.3 have
more details.
Furthermore, Section 5.4 separately estimates the partial effect of FPP on fertility for
women with different characteristics. A more-educated woman, a woman whose first child
is a son, or a woman living in a better-developed coastal province tends to desire fewer
children and, thus, receives lighter pressure from FPP. Additionally, Section 5.5 analyzes
the impact of FPP on the age of first marriage. The probability of early marriage falls
under FPP, particularly when the FPP is strongly enforced.
Finally, Section 6 checks the sensitivity of results to the use of different measures of FPP.
Section 6.1 shows that the impact of FPP on fertility is robust as the heterogeneity of
the measure is characterized by different probability distributions of childbearing age.
Section 6.2 further shows that, given the data and empirical strategies to be constant,
using an incomplete measure would systematically underestimate the impact of FPP on
fertility and adopting an endogenous measure or a measure lacking heterogeneity would
even generate a positive effect of the policy. Section 7 concludes the findings of the paper.
This paper can hardly close the debate, but still makes significant contributions to the
field. First, it highlights the importance of the measurement of FPP and improves the
existing measures according to a more complete history of FPP. Second, it thoroughly
analyzes the effect of FPP on fertility and the age of first marriage based on the new
measure and checks the sensitivity of estimation to the use of different measures.
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2 A History of China’s Family Planning Policy
China’s Population and Family Planning Law1 points out:
China being a populous country, family planning is a fundamental State policy.
The State adopts a comprehensive measure to control the size and raise the
general quality of the population.
Literally, controlling the size of population is the primary purpose of China’s FPP, which
has been achieved mainly by setting a “quota” of children allowed per family.
Over time, the quota became smaller and relevant measures got tougher from the point
of view of promotion towards a mandate. Particularly, China’s FPP has experienced
four periods: the period without FPP (1949–1963), the period with mild and narrowly
implemented FPP (1963–1971), the period with strong and widely enforced FPP (1971–
1980), and the period with the strictest one-child policy (1980–present).
In each period of FPP, the policy was tougher for urban people than for rural people
because the tradition of big family and son preference has been more deep-rooted in rural
areas. Moreover, the policy was stronger for Han people2 than for non-Han people as
family planning was less urgent for the non-Hans with a smaller size of population.
The rest of this section introduces more historical details of the evolution of China’s FPP
over periods3 and the policy differences between urban and rural people and between Han
and non-Han people in each period, as reflected in Figures 1 and 24. Both figures include
the overall TFR of China, the circle-connected line, over the calendar years. Figure 1
further shows both the urban and rural TFR and Figure 2 adds the TFR for Han and
non-Han people. Different periods of FPP are segmented by dashed lines.
[Figure 1 and 2 are inserted here.]
Most of the history presented below is cited or summarized from Yang (2004) and Yang
(2010).
1http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/11/content_75954.htm. This paper studies the family planning
policy of the People’s Republic of China, which was founded in 1949.
2The 2010 Census of China indicated that 91.51% of Chinese were Hans (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Sixth_National_Population_Census_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China).
3For convenience, denote the four periods by period 0 to 3.
4Figure 1 and 2 will not be used to prove the causal effect of FPP on fertility, but will only be used to show
the consistency between history and TFR.
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2.1 Period 0: Without family planning policy (1949–1963)
On the eve of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the supreme leader
Mao Zedong publicly argued that China preferred a large population,5 which also fit
China’s traditional concept of fertility, Duo Zi Duo Fu (more children, more happiness).
Moreover, China was deeply influenced by a birth-encouraging policy of the Soviet Union.6
Consequently, from 1949 to 1953, China strictly limited birth control and financially
subsidized large families.7
With a rapid population growth, China began to abolish or relax certain restrictions on
birth control in 1954.8 Meanwhile, some influential scholars like Shao Lizi and Ma Yinchu,
publicly promoted FPP.9 Thereafter, the knowledge of birth control spread through public
media to some extent.10 However, no FPP was officially conceived.
In 1958, with the onset of the Great Leap Forward campaign that aimed to use China’s
vast population to rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy into a modern
communist society,11 the discussion on FPP was politically incorrect.12 The campaign
was followed by a great famine (1959–1962), which led to a dramatic decline in TFR, from
5.679 in 1958 to 3.287 in 1961.13 Under such circumstances, FPP was rarely discussed.
When the famine ended in 1962, women began to make up fertility and the TFR rose
back to 6.023 in 1962 and even to 7.502 in 1963.14
Figures 1 and 2 well support this history. In this period, the overall TFR remained
high in the beginning, largely dropped during 1959–1961, started to recover in 1962, and
reached to an even higher level in 1963. Figure 1 further shows that urban and rural
TFRs co-moved in the period, with the urban TFR being slightly lower. No Han or
non-Han TFR for this period was found.
5Mao said: “A large population is preferred in China. No matter how large it is, we can always handle it with
production. . . Human being is the most valuable resource of the world. . . Human can create any miracle.” (Yang,
2004, pp. 43)
6A mother bearing a large family in the Soviet Union would be awarded an honorary title Mother Heroine
(Yang, 2004, pp. 44). Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mother_Heroine.
7China strongly restricted sterilization and abortion, and strictly controlled the production and sale of con-
traceptives whose import was banned (Yang, 2004, pp. 44–45).
8In 1954, China canceled the restriction on contraception and the sale of contraceptives and relaxed the
restriction on abortion. Sterilization was, however, still under strong control (Yang, 2004, pp. 47–48).
9Shao and Ma both supported contraception and late marriage, but held different views on abortion (Yang,
2004, pp. 48–50, 52).
10The knowledge of birth control only spread to some cities of some provinces (Yang, 2004, pp. 50, 53, 54, 58).
11http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Leap_Forward.
12Yang (2004, pp. 59).
13Yang (2004, pp. 61).
14Yang (2004, pp. 61–62).
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2.2 Period 1: Mild and narrowly implemented family planning policy (1963–
1971)
Pressured by the make-up fertility in 1962, the Chinese government issued an instruc-
tion on the implementation of family planning on December 18th, 1962, known as the
No. [62]698 document, which marked the start of China’s FPP.15
The period-1 FPP, in general, featured the setting of a population growth target,16 late
marriage,17 the establishment of family planning institutions,18 and the dissemination
of family planning knowledge and technology.19 Specific FPP varied by province. For
instance, Shandong’s FPP could be informally stated as “one (child) is not few, two are
just right, three are too many”. Shanghai’s policy suggested that a couple should not bear
more than three children, the birth spacing should be at least four years, and a woman’s
age of bearing the first child should exceed 26 years.20 Despite of differences, the quota
of children allowed per family was generally set to be three. Although bearing more
than three children was not mandatorily prohibited, having a large family would result in
political or social pressure because the FPP was being promoted mainly through effective
political or social movements. Economic measures were also adopted; for example, small
families would be subsidized in some way.21
The period-1 FPP was designed to be narrowly implemented only for urban Han people
as they were the majority of urban people. The urban TFR was expected to fall in this
period, which is supported by Figure 1. Contrarily, the rural TFR remained high in
period 1. Since urban Han people only took a small proportion of the entire population
of China,22 the overall TFR stayed at high levels in this period. Figure 2 implies that
both Han and non-Han TFRs were high in period 1 although both of them were missing
before 1971. One of the reasons is that rural areas, where the majority of Han or non-Han
people lived, were not covered by FPP in this period.
Two exceptions should be noted. First, the urban Han people living in the five au-
tonomous regions were not covered by FPP in this period.23 Second, the urban non-Han
15Yang (2010, pp. 27). Because the document was released in the late 1962, I have assumed that it came into
effect from 1963.
16The annual population growth rate targets were 2%, 1.5%, and 1% for the Recovery period (1963–1965), the
third Five-year plan (1966–1970), and the fourth Five-year plan (1971–1975), respectively (Yang, 2004, pp. 62).
17The Ministry of Health proposed late marriage in a national conference in 1963, and later received approval
from the central government (Yang, 2004, pp. 62).
18The national family planning institution was established in 1964 and local agencies were founded from 1963
(Yang, 2004, pp. 65).
19Contraceptive knowledge and devices were available in local hospitals. Restrictions on abortion and steril-
ization were basically removed (Yang, 2004, pp. 65–67).
20Yang (2004, pp. 68).
21Yang (2004, pp. 64, 74).
22Rural people took over 80% of the total population (Yang, 2004, pp. 69). Therefore, urban Han people should
take less than 20%.
23Yang (2004, pp. 144–145). The five autonomous regions, including Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Ningxia,
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people living outside the five autonomous regions might be impacted by FPP in this
period, particularly when they identified the ethnicity of their children as Han.24
From 1966, the Cultural Revolution negatively shocked the function of family planning
institutions and the implementation of FPP. However, the FPP was not abolished and
the urban TFR remained at relatively low levels.25 Meanwhile, contraceptive pills were
actively researched and developed.26
2.3 Period 2: Strong and widely implemented family planning policy (1971–
1980)
Concerned for the negative impact of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government
issued a report on family planning in 1971, known as the No. [71]51 document, to re-
emphasize the importance of FPP. The report signified that FPP recovered from the
Cultural Revolution and stepped into a new stage.27
Similar to period 1, the period-2 policy also involved a population growth target and
technological supports. Moreover, the FPP became more nationally uniform, known as
“late, long, few”. “Late” means late marriage and childbearing. The recommended age
of marriage was 25 years or above for men and was 23 years or above for women; women
were suggested to have children after 24 years of age. “Long” means the birth spacing
should be at least three years. “Few” means a couple can at most bear two children.28
The period-2 policy was stronger than that in period 1. First, a couple could at most
have two children in period 2, while three children were allowed, though not encouraged
in period 1. Second, the enforcement of period-2 policy was stronger. Mao Zedong,
the supreme leader, promoted FPP harder in period 2,29 and thus, greatly strengthened
its enforcement. Other than subsidizing small families as in period 1, certain penalties
against too many births were further applied in period 2. For example, rural people who
did not comply with FPP would face a loss in food distribution in 1970s.30
In 1971, the FPP began to spread to the urban Han people living in the five autonomous
regions31 and to all rural Han people,32 literally covering all Han people, as reflected in
and Guangxi, are provincial administrative areas of China, primarily for non-Han people. See http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_regions_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China for more details.
24Yang (2004, pp. 144–145).
25The urban TFR kept falling in this period only expect in 1968. Moreover, family planning institutions started
to recover in 1969 (Yang, 2004, pp. 75).
26Yang (2004, pp. 70).
27Yang (2004, pp. 73).
28The policy was first implemented in some parts of China, and then was extended to the whole nation in 1973
(Yang, 2004, pp. 73).
29For example, in 1974, Mao said: “We must control the population.” (Yang, 2004, pp. 73)
30Yang (2004, pp. 80, 135).
31Yang (2004, pp. 144–145).
32Yang (2004, pp. 77–79).
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Figure 1. As the majority of rural people were affected by FPP from 1971, the rural TFR
started to drop in 1971. The declining of both urban and rural TFRs drove the overall
TFR to decrease, as well. However, the population growth target differed between urban
and rural areas. By 1975, the urban population annual growth rate was set to fall to 1%
and the rural growth rate was designed to drop to 1.5%.33 As all Han people were covered
by FPP in this period, Figure 2 shows that the Han TFR largely dropped after 1971 and
the TFR gap between Han and non-Han people widened. Although non-Han people
were not officially constrained by FPP in period 2,34 other factors, such as improved
health conditions and easier access to family planning service, might have pulled down
the non-Han TFR in this period, as shown in Figure 2.
2.4 Period 3: One-child policy (1980–present)
As a natural evolution of the period-2 FPP, the one-child policy was conceived in 1979
and was intensively propagandized in 1980.35 The one-child policy, as the name suggests,
restricted a family to have only one child, particularly designed for Han families. This
policy was apparently stricter than the previous versions.
The strictness of the one-child policy was also reflected by its enforcement. The en-
forcement of the previous FPPs before 1980 was mainly driven by political, social, or
administrative forces, but not laws. In 1978, FPP appeared in the Constitution for the
first time and came up with more details in the 1982 amended Constitution. From the
late 1980s, central and local governments successively legislated on FPP.36 Legal mea-
sures, such as monetary penalties and subsidies,37 ensured the effective enforcement of
the one-child policy.
In the early 1980s, the one-child policy was successfully implemented in urban Han fami-
lies, but received large resistance from rural Han people.38 Subsequently, in the mid-1980s,
the one-child policy was relaxed for rural Han families and they were allowed to have a
second child in certain cases; for example, when the first child was a daughter.39 As a
result, both the urban and rural TFRs stayed at low levels and their gap always existed,
as shown in Figure 1.
In 1982, the FPP started to cover most non-Han people, but in more relaxed forms. In
33Yang (2004, pp. 72).
34(Yang, 2004, pp. 143–145). The urban or rural non-Han people who were living outside the five autonomous
regions might be affected by the period-2 FPP, particularly when they identified the ethnicity of their children
as Han.
35In September 1980, the CPC central committee wrote an open letter to expound the necessity of the one-child
policy. This event was usually considered as the starting point of the one-child policy (Yang, 2004, pp. 86).
36Yang (2004, pp. 161).
37McElroy and Yang (2000), and Li and Zhang (2008) discussed relevant topics.
38Yang (2004, pp. 86).
39Yang (2004, pp. 87). This case reflects a strong son preference in rural areas.
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general, an urban non-Han family could conditionally have two children and a rural non-
Han couple was conditionally allowed to have three or even more children. For an ethnic
group with a small population size, the policy was even further relaxed.40 In Figure 2,
the Han TFR remained low and the non-Han TFR clearly dropped during the period of
1980 to 1989. The Han and non-Han TFR gap, though smaller, still existed.
2.5 Summary
Section 2.1 to 2.4 briefly introduced the history of FPP by emphasizing the secular and
cross-sectional policy variations. Over time, the general FPP got stronger in terms of the
number of births allowed per family and the strength of enforcement. Cross-sectionally,
the FPP spread from urban to rural areas and from Han to non-Han people, with weaker
policies for rural or non-Han people in all the periods, as supported by Figures 1 and 2.
Since the paper focuses on the impact of FPP on fertility, Table 1 summarizes the number
of children allowed per family over periods and across different groups of people41 and
will be used to test if the results of this paper match well with the history of FPP.
[Table 1 is inserted here.]
3 A Short Review of Existing Measures of Family Planning
Policy
Quantitative analysis of FPP requires the appropriate measurement of FPP. Presently,
relevant studies primarily take advantage of the history of FPP to construct measures.
Particularly, they utilize basic demographic variables, such as birth year, living area,
ethnicity, etc., which are easy to obtain in regular survey data, to construct variables
to express the secular and/or cross-sectional policy variations. This will be termed as
“constructed measures” in the paper.
Generally, existing constructed measures have several problems: incompleteness, endo-
geneity, and lack of heterogeneity.
An incomplete measure ignores part of the history and therefore, captures only a part of
the policy variations and tends to under-estimate the impact of FPP.
40Yang (2004, pp. 146–148).
41Through this paper, I will mainly use urban/rural and Han/non-Han to capture the cross-sectional variations
of FPP. FPP also varied across provinces, but information is insufficient to specify the provincial differences,
particularly for earlier periods. Instead, the following econometric analysis will simply control for province
dummies and their interactions with cohort variables to capture the provincial policy variations. Some recent
policy change is not considered in the paper. For example, a couple who are both the only child in their families
can have a second child.
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Some constructed measures reflect a part of the secular policy variation, but fail to take
cross-sectional variations into account. Yang and Chen (2004) used the 1992 Household
and Economy Fertility Survey (HESF) sample to assess the effect of FPP on fertility.
They applied the year dummies of being married, from 1970 to 1989, to capture the
various impacts of FPP for different marriage cohorts. Narayan and Peng (2006) used
time series data and models to estimate the effect of FPP on fertility. They measured
FPP with time dummies for two periods, 1970-1979 and 1980-2000. Similarly, Edlund
et al. (2008) measured FPP with a dummy variable of being exposed to the one-child
policy one year prior to a mother’s childbearing.
Some studies utilized cross-sectional policy variations, but failed to capture secular vari-
ations. Cai (2010) used a county level cross-sectional data of Jiangsu and Zhejiang
province, collected from the 2001 statistical year books of the two provinces and the 2000
census compilations, to estimate the effect of FPP on fertility. He measured FPP by
using the percentage of population with agricultural hukou42 and the percentage of Han
population in each county.
More studies took both secular and cross-sectional policy variations into account, but
either missed a part of the urban-rural or Han-non-Han variations or a part of the policy
change over time. Li et al. (2005) applied a difference-in-difference approach to assess
the impact of the one-child policy on fertility. The treatment and control groups were
Han and non-Han people. The pre-treatment and post-treatment samples were taken
from the 1982 and 1990 census, respectively. Li and Zhang (2007) used a provincial panel
data involving 28 provinces over 20 years (1978–1998) to estimate the effect of birth rate
on economic growth. In the first stage regressions, they used the percentage of non-Han
people in each province/year to instrument the birth rate. Li and Zhang (2008) also
adopted a difference-in-difference approach in the first stage regressions, similar to Li
et al. (2005). Qian (2009) used an individual level cross-sectional sample from the 1990
census and the 1989 CHNS to test the quantity-quality trade-off hypothesis. In the first
stage regressions, she made use of cross-region policy variations and the policy evolution
after 1970 to instrument family size. Islam and Smyth (2010) used the 2008 China Health
and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS) data to estimate the effect of number of
children on parental health. In the first stage regressions, they took advantage of urban-
rural policy variations and the policy change after 1970 to instrument the number of
children. Banerjee et al. (2010) used an individual level cross-sectional data, collected in
the 2008 Urban-Rural Migration in China and Indonesia Survey (RUMiCI), to study the
impact of number of children on parental saving behaviors. In the first stage regressions,
they used a dummy variable to capture the policy change in the early 1970s and included
42Hukou is a household registration system in China. In general, urban and rural people have non-agricultural
and agricultural hukou, respectively. Rural people who temporarily migrate to urban areas generally keep the
agricultural hukou as before.
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the interaction between the dummy and the gender of the first child to capture the effect
of son preference. Wu and Li (2011) used an individual level panel sample with five waves
from the CHNS data to assess the effect of family size on maternal health. In the first
stage regressions, they constructed a time variable about the one-child policy to interact
it with urban dummy and Han dummy and used them to instrument family size.
Some measures are endogenously constructed, which may bias the effect of FPP on fer-
tility or invalidate the role of FPP as an instrumental variable for fertility. As reviewed
above, Yang and Chen (2004) used the year dummies of being married to capture secular
policy variations, but the year of marriage is endogenous and might be correlated with
unobserved factors related to fertility. Similarly, Edlund et al. (2008), Qian (2009), Islam
and Smyth (2010), and Banerjee et al. (2010) considered whether some child was born in
some period of FPP to measure the exposure to the policy, but the timing of childbearing
may be endogenous.
Other than endogeneity, the dummy variables also lack heterogeneity. For example, a
20-year-old woman and a 40-year-old woman both bear a child in the beginning of the
one-child policy. If a dummy variable is used to measure the exposure to the policy,
then both values are set to be 1. However, intuitively, the younger woman should have
larger exposure to the policy because she will be affected by the policy nearly through
out her entire childbearing period, while the older woman almost physiologically finishes
childbearing when the policy just starts.
Wu and Li (2011) constructed a more heterogeneous measure, which was proportional to
the length of time exposed to the policy, but it still needed improvements. For example, if
a woman is exposed to the policy between 20 and 30 years of age and another is exposed
between 30 and 40 years of age, their measure will be assigned the same value. However,
the first woman is supposed to have larger exposure because 20–30 years is the interval
of peak age for childbearing, while 30–40 years is not. Their measure did not consider
such heterogeneity.
This paper will try to improve the constructed measure to make it more complete, exoge-
nous and heterogeneous. Further, Section 6 shows how results may change if incomplete,
endogenous, or homogeneous measures are used. A few studies have also used specific
measures for FPP other than the constructed measures.
Specific measures directly come from a data set that contains specific information on
FPP. Schultz and Zeng (1995) used a specific individual level cross-sectional data for
some rural areas of three provinces in China, which were collected in the 1985 In-Depth
Fertility Survey (IDFS), to assess the effect of local family planning and health programs
on fertility. FPP is measured by the availability of a family planning service station, a
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family planning outreach worker, a doctor or nurse, and a local clinic in a rural village.43
McElroy and Yang (2000) used a specific household level cross-sectional data for some
rural areas across ten provinces, which were collected in the 1992 HESF, to estimate the
intensity of county-level FPP on the number of children per family. The HESF sample
provides county-level monetary penalties imposed on “over-quota” births and they are
used to measure the county-level intensity of FPP. Li and Zhang (2008) used an individual
level cross-sectional data, collected in the 1989 CHNS, to study how birth behaviors of a
woman are affected by the birth behaviors of her neighbors. In the first stage regressions,
they measured the one-child policy with community-level monetary penalties on “over-
quota” births and subsidies for one-child families and used it to instrument the fertility
of neighbors, which is similar to McElroy and Yang (2000).
Specificity is one of the most notable advantages of such measures as they are so detailed
that they can hardly be contaminated by irrelevant factors. However, the problems
are similar to the ones of constructed measures. For example, information of monetary
penalties is available only for the year of survey and variations only occur across, but
not within communities. Moreover, such data sets are relatively exclusive and difficult to
acquire.44 Therefore, this paper will not discuss specific measures.
4 Data, New Measure of Family Planning Policy, and Empirical
Specifications
4.1 Data: Introduction, descriptive statistics, and representativeness
The paper mainly uses the birth history data from the CHNS.45 The ongoing CHNS is one
of the most widely used micro-data about China. Conducted by an international team,
the CHNS collected information on household and individual economic, demographic, and
social variables, particularly the factors about health and nutrition, in 1989, 1991, 1993,
1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2009, across nine provinces.46 A large group of interviewees
have been followed longitudinally.
The CHNS surveyed ever-married women, who were below 5247 years of age, about their
43The availability was measured by dummy variables. The interactions of the dummy variables were also
controlled in regressions.
44This paper will use a data set from the CHNS for empirical analysis, like Li and Zhang (2008). However, the
data used here does not include the community level sample from which Li and Zhang obtained the information
on monetary penalties and subsidies. Different from other parts of the CHNS data, the community level sample
can only be obtained after a formal application is approved.
45More information about the CHNS can be found on the official website: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/
china.
46Before wave 2000, the survey covered eight provinces: Guangxi, Guizhou, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu,
Liaoning, and Shandong. Heilongjiang was included in wave 2000 and thereafter.
47The surveyed women were under 50 in wave 1991. Although only the women under 52 (or 50) should
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birth history, in 1991, 1993, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2009. A woman may be tracked
wave-wise. The CHNS team combined the birth history data of all waves, kept only the
latest wave of record for each woman who has ever been survey, and released the refined
cross-sectional data online.48 In other words, the data contains the birth history of a
woman up to the latest wave of survey for her. The data was restricted to women aged
15 or above during the survey. To rule out extreme cases, women who ever bore a child
when they were aged below 15 or above 49 years were dropped from the data.49
The birth history data includes the date of birth, gender, living arrangement, and date
of death of every child that a woman has ever given birth to and allows us to map the
history of FPP onto the entire childbearing process. Variables other than birth history
of those ever-married women, such as education, ethnicity, marriage, and living area,
can be found from other modules of the CHNS. For the currently-married women, the
information of their husband can be further obtained.
Only ever-married, but not all women were asked about their birth history because mar-
riage is traditionally and legally regarded as a pre-condition for childbearing in China.
Based on the data used in the paper, the proportion of non-marital childbearing is below
5% and has no rising trend over cohorts, which is different from what Hotz et al. (1997)
presented about the non-marital childbearing in the U.S.50
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of selected variables for the ever-married women. The
statistics for husbands correspond to currently-married women only.
[Table 2 is inserted here.]
The cohort ranges over 1931–1991, with cohorts 1951–1970 being the majority. Observa-
tions are balanced across nine provinces.
The average age of the surveyed women and their husbands is about 43. The women of
cohorts 1931–1960 basically finished childbearing in survey years, while the rest younger
cohorts were still at childbearing ages when they were surveyed. This is considered to be
important for interpreting the number of children ever born over cohorts.
Ignoring the column of cohorts 1931–1940, the rest cohorts show that the average number
of children ever born falls from about three to below one. The proportion of bearing
zero or one child greatly rises, while the proportion of bearing two, three, or above
be surveyed, around 13% women in the sample were above the supposed age during the survey. I kept those
observations to enlarge the sample, after checking their validity.
48The data is named “m10birth”, and was released in July 2011 on the official website of the CHNS. The
data doesn’t contain the information of wave for any woman, therefore I merged the data to other ever-married
women data (for example, the marriage history data for the same set of women) with the information of wave,
and mapped the latest wave to each woman in the birth history data.
49Only 0.4% observations were dropped.
50They pointed out, in the U.S., less than 6% of births were out-of-wedlock in 1963, while this proportion rose
to 30% in 1992.
13
three children decreases rapidly. Meanwhile, the sex-ratio at birth increases over the
cohorts of mothers. As warned above, the trends should not be simply interpreted as the
evolution of the total fertility because younger cohorts have not physiologically finished
childbearing during surveys. The trends from cohort 1941–1950 to cohort 1951–1960,
the older cohorts who have basically finished childbearing, are consistent with the trends
through all cohorts.
However, the statistics for cohorts 1930–1941, the oldest cohorts in the data, fight against
the trends. These cohorts generally feature low levels of fertility in the data. It might
be true because these cohorts were around 20–30 years old, i.e., their peak ages for
childbearing, during the great famine that greatly pulled down the level of fertility. It
might also not be true because these cohorts of women could be non-randomly selected
due to some reasons. As Lam and Duryea (1992) pointed out, the fertility level of older
cohorts is expected to have, if any, a downward bias because higher mortality among
women is associated with the highest fertility and women with smaller family sizes are
more likely to survive to the survey. This point will be further discussed when interpreting
the effect of FPP on fertility.
As for other variables, the age of first marriage has no certain trend over cohorts, partly
because a large group of younger cohorts had not got married. The proportion of women
living in urban areas during the surveys rises first and then decreases. The rising part
reflects the process of urbanization, while the declining part implies that rural young
cohorts tend to get married earlier and thus, enter the sample earlier. The proportion of
Han women and their husbands stays steady over cohorts, i.e., it lies between 80 to 90%.
The years of schooling shows clear increasing trends for both women and their husbands.
FPP, according to its content, may not only lower fertility, but also affect the age of first
marriage. To further study the impact of FPP on the probability of getting married at
some age, I combined the data of ever-married women, which was described above, and
the data of never-married women up to the latest wave of surveys.
Given the possibly problematic fertility levels of the oldest cohorts and under-sampling
of northwestern provinces of China, it’s necessary to check the representativeness of the
data. The only population indicator available to the paper is the period TFR, as shown
in Figure 1 and 2. Therefore, I calculated a sample period TFR, based on the entire
birth history of the women in the sample, to see how it matches with the population
counterparts.




B(ag, t)/W (ag, t) (1)
14
where TFRt means the TFR in year t; ag means age group, with 7 5-year age groups
through 15 to 49; B(ag, t) means the total number of children born in year t and to the
women of age group ag in that year; W (ag, t) means the total number of women of age
group ag in year t.
Since the cohort ranges from 1931 to 1991 in the data, I can only calculate the TFR for
years 1980–2006.51 This part of fertility rate well fits the population indicator and their
correlation coefficient reaches 0.88. As a result, the data proves to be representative at
least in terms of the period TFR.52
4.2 New measurement of family planning policy and model specifications for
the impact of family planning policy on fertility
Based on the cross-sectional data introduced in the previous subsection, this paper will
focus on the static analysis of the impact of FPP on fertility. According to Hotz et al.
(1997), a married couple maximizes their utility by choosing the number (and the quality)
of children and consumption subject to budget and time constrains, and will accordingly
have the following demand function for the number of children n:
n = N(p, w, I,θ), (2)
where p is a vector of various prices which directly or indirectly affects n; w is the wage
of mothers (the price of mothers’ time); I is the household income; and θ is a vector
of attributes that affects n, including parental preferences, technologies influencing the
production of children and services related to children, parental fecundity, etc.
China’s FPP is a package involving birth quota, and family planning technologies, tools
and services, and thus, can enter the demand function through various channels.53 With
an appropriate measure of FPP which integrates different channels, the demand function
can be expressed as
n = N(FPP ,p, w, I,θ), (3)
where FPP is a vector of FPP measures of the three periods and the function arguments
other than FPP will not explicitly include the content of FPP.
51The older cohorts are absent for the calculation of the TFR before 1980, while the younger cohorts are not
complete for calculating the TFR after 2006.
52A more standard way of computing the period TFR is based on year-by-year surveys. However, during the
period when the population TFRs were available, CHNS only carried out five waves of surveys among which
only two waves of cross-sectional data, wave 1993 and 2000, contain the information of birth history and are
available from the CHNS website. Nevertheless, the 1993 and 2000 TFRs, calculated based on the two waves of
cross-sectional data, are close to the population counterparts, and are even closer than the figures derived from
equation (1).
53For example, the birth quota brings in a quota constraint; family planning tools and services can affect n
through their prices; family planning technologies can be part of the attributes.
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Easterlin and Crimmins (1985) proposed a different analytical framework for fertility and
specified three channels, the demand for children, the supply of children and fertility reg-
ulation, through which various factors affect the number of children ever born. Function
(3) also matches well with their framework and all function arguments can be mapped
onto the three channels. Other than the arguments specified earlier in this section, their
supply channel highlighted the survival rate (or mortality rate) of children which will be
further added to θ in (3).
As the effect of FPP on n is the major interest of the paper, other variables will be
reduced to exogenous variables such that a reduced-form equation will be estimated, as
in (4).














ηc,m + εi. (4)
In equation (4), i indicates woman i. ni is the number of children ever born to woman
i. FPPj measures the period-j FPP, with period 0 as the base period. Xk’s involve a
set of variables of women and their husbands, such as years of schooling, age at survey,
etc. ζl’s capture various group effects, including cohort effects (ζc), urban/rural effects
(ζurban), Han/non-Han effects (ζHan), province effects (ζprov) and survey year effects (ζt).
ηc,m’s further consider different cohort effects for urban and rural people, for Hans and
non-Hans, across provinces and for the people surveyed in different years.
Variables p, w, I and θ are assumed to be characterized by the Xk’s, ζl’s and ηc,m’s.
For example, prices, mortality rate and technologies exhibited trends over cohorts, and
the trends differed between groups of people. Other than the associations with group
variables, wages, household income, parental preferences and parental fecundity were
also affected by years of schooling, age, etc. All other uncontrolled factors go to the error
term εi, and are assumed to be uncorrelated with covariates.
Since FPP evolves over time and varies between urban and rural areas and between Han
and non-Han people, I have expressed FPPj as a function of c, t, urban, and Han, as
in equation (5). The first two capture the secular variations of the policy,54 and the last
two help measure the cross-sectional variations of the policy. Further, I have assumed a
quasi-separable form for FPPj(c, t, urban,Han), as in equation (6)
FPPj = FPPj(c, t, urban,Han) (5)
= δ0FPPj(c, t) + δ1DurbanFPPj(c, t) + δ2DHanFPPj(c, t), (6)
54Different cohorts were exposed to FPP differently; the survey year helps measure the length of time exposed
to the ongoing one-child policy.
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where Durban and DHan stand for urban dummy and Han dummy. In one word, sec-
ular policy variations are captured by a cohort-year specific policy measure FPPj(c, t)
and cross-sectional policy variations are reflected by interacting FPPj(c, t) with group
dummies.
FPPj(c, t) can be further specified as follows. For an individual from a given cohort, the
degree of exposure to period-j FPP depends on how physiologically possible it is for the
individual to bear a child in period j. For example, if an individual was at her peak age
of childbearing in period j, she was more likely to be affected by FPP than individuals at
other ages and thus, should have a larger value for FPPj(c, t). Therefore, I was required
to first figure out the probability of childbearing at every age.
Figure 3 plots the probability distribution of childbearing age, denoted by f(age). At
each age, f(age) is the total number of children born to the women at that age divided
by the total number of children ever born to all women in the data. I have assumed the
probability of childbearing to be zero for the women aged below 15 or above 49 years.
Clearly, probabilities sum up to one. Figure 3 shows that the probability rapidly climbs
up after the age of 15 years and reaches the peak at around the age of 24 years and then
gradually falls.
[Figure 3 is inserted here.]
agebj(c, t) and age
e
j(c, t) are defined as the age of a cohort-c woman, i.e., a woman born in







ageb1(c, t) = 1963− c, ageb2(c, t) = 1971− c, ageb3(c, t) = 1980− c;
agee1(c, t) = 1971− c, agee2(c, t) = 1980− c, agee3(c, t) = t− c.
Figure 4 presents FPP1(c, t), FPP2(c, t), and FPP3(c, t), as defined above, over cohorts.
[Figure 4 is inserted here.]
Clearly, the women born in 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s were mostly affected by the period-
1, period-2, and period-3 FPP, respectively. Since the period-3 FPP, i.e., the one-child
policy, is still active, the interval exposed to the policy for a woman born after 1960 is the
interval between the age of 15 years (or the age at the beginning of the one-child policy)
to the age at the latest survey.
Notably, if f(age) in equation (7) is differently defined, the values of FPPj and subsequent
results may change. Section 6 will discuss the sensitiveness of results to various choices
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of f(age).
Finally, the empirical specification becomes

















ηc,m + εi. (8)
where βj0 = βjδ0, βj1 = βjδ1, and βj2 = βjδ2. Since FPP aims to reduce fertility and
is stricter for urban or Han people through periods, βj0, βj1, and βj2 are expected to be
negative or at least non-positive.
The newly constructed measure improves in completeness, exogeneity, and heterogeneity,
compared to existing measures. First, the new measure takes the secular and cross-
sectional policy variations of all three periods into account, thus, capturing the history
more completely. Second, the new measure is constructed based on birth cohort, survey
year, urban dummy and Han dummy and is sufficiently exogenous.55 Third, the new
measure largely allows women’s heterogeneous exposures to FPP.
To complete the regression specification, I have added three more variables to Xk’s: the
exposure to the great famine in 1959-1962, the exposure to the post-famine period and
the exposure to the pre-People’s Republic of China (PRC) period.
In order to capture the fertility drop caused by the great famine in 1959-1962, I have
defined an exposure to the famine by using equation (7), with ageb being the age in 1959
and agee being the age in 1962. Right after the famine, during 1962-1963, fertility was
largely made up. I have defined an exposure to this period by using equation (7), with
ageb being the age in 1962 and agee being the age in 1963.
I have only discussed the FPP in the PRC since 1949, as little information on population
related policies is available for the pre-PRC period. Women born in 1934 or later became
fertile (aged 15 years) in the PRC period, and therefore, are assigned value zero on the
pre-PRC exposure. For women born before 1934, I have defined the exposure by using
equation (7), with ageb being 15 years and agee being the age in 1949.
In equation (8), ζurban, ζHan, ζprov and ζt are all dummy variables. ζc can be specified in
two ways: a high order polynomial of cohort trend, and cohort dummies. By construction,
FPP1(c, t) and FPP2(c, t) are constant within a cohort. Therefore, for including these
two variables, the high order polynomial of cohort trend should be used. The cohort trend
is defined as the difference between birth year and 1931 - the oldest cohort in the sample.
55FPPj is also constructed based on the function f(.), which is endogenously derived from the sample. However,
the function is equally imposed on all observations, and thus, will not lead to a problem of endogeneity.
18
Empirically, I will include the cohort trend and its second, third, and fourth order terms.
Furthermore, to specify the ηc,m’s, the cohort trend will be interacted with urban dummy,
Han dummy, province dummies and survey year dummies.56 Cohort dummies will also
be considered in regressions.57
5 Main Empirical Results
5.1 Regressions of fertility on family planning policy
Table 3 shows regression results of fertility on FPP by using the data of ever-married
women. Robust standard errors are reported in squared brackets through all columns.
[Table 3 is inserted here.]
Column [1] is the regression on which further analysis is mainly based upon. FPPj (j =
1, 2, 3) is the FPPj(c, t) in equation (8). Other than FPP related variables, it controls for
urban dummy (Durban), Han dummy (DHan), years of schooling and squared demeaned
years of schooling (divided by 2), age at survey and squared demeaned age at survey
(divided by 2), exposure to the great famine, exposure to the post-famine period, exposure
to the pre-PRC period, the polynomial of cohort trend up to the fourth order, survey year
dummies, province dummies, and interactions of cohort trend with urban dummy, Han
dummy, survey year dummies and province dummies. As indicated below equation (8),
coefficients of FPP related variables are expected to be negative. Column [1] shows that,
almost all such coefficients are negative and most of them are statistically significant at
5% level. Partial effects of FPP will be computed in Section 5.2.
By adding Durban×DHan×FPPj to Column [1], Column [2] additionally captures more
cross-sectional policy variations. Column [2] implies that the three-term interactions are
not statistically significant determinants of fertility and the coefficients of other FPP
related variables are quite similar to Column [1].
Columns [1] and [2] only control for women’s variables. As Section 4.2 suggests, variables
of women’s husbands may be the determinants of fertility. Based on Column [1], Column
[3] further controls for variables of husbands, including their ethnicity and interactions
with FPP1, FPP2 and FPP3,
58 husbands years of schooling and its squared demeaned
56Only the linear cohort trend out of the fourth-order polynomial will be interacted with those dummy variables.
57In such regressions, cohort dummies will be interacted with province dummies and survey year dummies.
Correspondingly, FPPj(c, t) will be dropped due to perfect collinearity, but their interactions with urban dummy
and Han dummy will be kept for the sake of analysis. To avoid dropping all FPP related variables, cohort dummies
will not be interacted with urban dummy or Han dummy in such regressions.
58The information of husbands will never enter the data and match with the record of their wives unless the
couple lived together during the survey, so the urban dummy always takes the same value for women and their
husbands. As a result, no urban dummy or its interactions with FPPj , or province or survey year dummies for
husbands need to be further added to Column [3].
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term, husbands age at survey and its squared demeaned term, the fourth-order polynomial
of husbands cohort trend as well as the cohort trend interacted with husbands urban
dummy, Han dummy, province dummies and survey year dummies. Since only currently-
married women could be matched with her husband’s record, quite a few observations are
dropped from Column [3]. So Column [3] regression will mainly be used for robustness
check rather than for further analysis. As the results show, almost all the FPP related
variables are negative and a part of them are statistically significant. Section 5.2 will
show how robust the partial effects of FPP derived from Column [3] will be compared to
those from Columns [1] and [2].
Based on Columns [1]-[3], Columns [4]-[6] replace the polynomial of cohort trend with co-
hort dummies and substitute cohort dummies×province dummies and cohort dummies×survey
year dummies for previous interactions involving cohort trend.59 FPP1, FPP2, FPP3,
exposure to the great famine and exposure to the pre-PRC period are dropped due to
perfect collinearity.60 These three columns are used to check the robustness of the co-
efficients of FPP related variables after cohort trends are replaced by cohort dummies
which are stronger measures of cohort effects. Compared to Columns [1] and [2], Columns
[4] and [5] have robust coefficients of Durban × FPPj; the coefficients of DHan × FPPj
have changed a bit, but generally preserve the signs. While compared to Column [3], the
coefficients of DHan×FPPj in Column [6] are quite robust; the effects of Durban×FPPj
in Column [6] become a bit larger and more statistically significant than Column [3].
Columns [7] and [8] are logit regressions with specifications similar to Column [1]. The
dependent variable of Column [7] regression is a dummy variable: whether the number
of children ever born to a woman is greater or equal to two. The dependent variable of
Column [8] regression is a dummy variable: whether the number of children is greater
or equal to three. All the coefficients in Columns [7] and [8] are marginal effects. We
can see that, FPP related variables, particularly the interactions, negatively impact the
probability of having more children.
As analyzed above, the coefficients of FPP related variables are robust through most
columns. Likewise, other control variables show similar patterns through columns. Years
of schooling negatively and significantly affect fertility, and the effect is even bigger when
education increases, while fertility is an increasing concave function of age at survey. The
great famine negatively shocked fertility, though statistically insignificant, and its partial
effect will also be computed in Section 5.2.
The “F stat. for FPP” stands for the F statistics for the joint significance test for the
variables involving FPP. Through almost all columns, F statistics are fairly large with p
59In Column [6], cohort dummies related variables of both women and their husbands are controlled for.
60By construction, they are perfectly collinear with cohort dummies, survey year dummies and their interac-
tions.
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values nearly 0, even when FPP1 to FPP3 are dropped in Columns [4]-[6]. For Columns
[1] to [3], F tests were applied separately for FPPj only and for interactions related to
FPPj only. Similarly, almost all p values are nearly 0.
61 The Chi-squared statistics
for the joint significance test for the variables involving FPP are also sufficiently large
with p values nearly 0, and the statistical significance is mainly reflected by interactions
related to FPPj. The R-squared and pseudo R-squared signify nice goodness-of-fit of all
specifications.
As pointed out in Section 4.1, the fertility of older cohorts may be underestimated. As
they are mainly the base cohorts for FPP, the underestimation of their fertility will bias
the coefficients of FPP related variables towards 0. Even in this situation, the effect of
FPP on fertility is strong. Therefore, the downward bias of fertility for older cohorts will
not essentially change the conclusion.
5.2 Partial effects of family planning policy on fertility
Based on the regression results from Table 3, Table 4 calculates the partial effect of FPP
on fertility, i.e., the fertility change attributed to the full exposure to some FPP provided
that other variables are constant.
[Table 4 is inserted here.]
Table 4 consists of three panels of results, representing the partial effects of FPP on
fertility derived from Columns [1]-[3] of Table 3. In each panel, women are categorized
and the entire period of FPP is segmented, as in Table 1. Along each group (row), the
number below “Period j” (j = 1, 2, 3) indicates the change in fertility of a woman in that
group if she had been fully exposed to the period-j FPP, keeping other factors constant.
For example, in Panel 1, the number -0.82, corresponding to “Rural Han” and “Period 2”,
means a rural Han woman would have 0.82 fewer children if she had been fully exposed
to the period-2 FPP, keeping all the other variables constant.
The method of calculation is explained as follows. Take the -0.82 again as an example. It
is calculated in the following way:
(−0.471+(−0.631))×max(FPP2|Durban = 0, DHan =
1) =
(− 0.471 + (−0.631))× 0.745 = −0.82, where -0.471 and -0.631 are the coefficients
of FPP2 and DHan × FPP2, and 0.745 is the maximum value of FPP2 for the rural
Han women. In Panel 2, the calculation considers the three-term interactions, and in
Panel 3, the FPP variables involving husbands’s information are taken into account for
calculation. For comparison, the average partial effect of the great famine on fertility is
also listed for each panel, using a similar method. The symbols ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
61The only exception is the F stat. for interactions only in Column [3]; its p value is 0.061.
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Through the three panels, some features are highlighted. First, for any group of women,
the partial effect of FPP on fertility generally gets larger and larger over periods. Second,
within almost any period, the partial effect for urban women is larger than rural women
and the partial effect for Han women is larger than non-Han women. Third, for Panel 1
and 2, partial effects start to be statistically significant from the period in which women
of the group began to be exposed to FPP.62 These three features are perfectly consistent
with what Table 1 implies, and thus, to some degree justify the measure constructed in
the paper.
Furthermore, the partial effects of FPP are quite robust through panels. Panels 1 and 2
show that full exposure to the great famine would have reduced fertility by 0.6; while the
effect in Panel 3 is a bit larger; but the three effects are all statistically insignificant and
smaller than most partial effects of FPP.
5.3 Percentage change of fertility explained by family planning policy
Other than the magnitude of the partial effect of FPP shown in Section 5.2, it is also
of interest to know what percentage the FPP has explained the fertility change for each
cohort and over cohorts. Section 5.3 will target the cohorts of which some women had
physiologically finished childbearing by the survey. The TFR over these cohorts is shown
in Figure 5.
[Figure 5 is inserted here.]




B(c, a)/W (c, a), (9)
where TFRc means the TFR of cohort c; a means age, from 15 to 49 years. B(c, a) means
the total number of children born to cohort-c women when they were aged a; W (c, a)
means the total number of cohort-c women when they were aged a. As no women born
after 1960 had physiologically completed childbearing by the survey,63 Figure 5 only
ranges from cohort 1931 to 1960. The cohort TFR is widely estimated (for example, Lam
and Duryea (1992), Olsen (1994), Lam and Duryea (1999), etc.), and surpasses the period
TFR in the sense that the period TFR uses the fertility level of current older women to
measure the fertility of current younger women when they get older in the future and
would be inaccurate when fertility is experiencing great transitions.
62The statistically significant effects of FPP for urban non-Han women in period 1 and 2 imply that exceptions,
listed in the note of Table 1, have dominated. This domination may result from that 84.6% urban non-Han women
in the sample lived outside the autonomous regions.
63In other words, none of the women of those cohorts were 49 years old or above by the survey.
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Clearly, Figure 5 is similar to what Table 2 shows: over cohorts, fertility first rises and
then falls. As pointed out in Section 4.1, the rising part of fertility may be problematic;
therefore, this subsection will only focus on the falling part, namely, cohorts 1943 to
1960. Table 5 shows the percentage change of fertility explained by FPP for each cohort.
The left panel uses all the women of cohorts 1943–1960, while the right panel selects the
women of cohorts 1943–1960 who were aged 45 years or above, i.e., the women who had
largely finished childbearing, by the survey.
[Table 5 is inserted here.]
In each panel, the first column predicts the fertility for each cohort based on the Column-
[1] regression of Table 3. The second column predicts the fertility by letting the variables
involving FPPj’s to be 0; in other words, it predicts the fertility for each cohort of women
had they never been exposed to FPP. The third column calculates the fertility increase
from the first to the second column in percentage.
According to the left panel, for all women of these cohorts, the predicted fertility with
actual FPP exposure is 2.31, while the predicted fertility with zero FPP is 3.55, which is
53.7% higher. Through cohorts 1943 to 1960, the percentage varies from about 25% to
76%. As a comparison, Table 5 also predicts the fertility had the women never received
schooling. Clearly, the increase of fertility in the absence of schooling, 17.3%, is much
smaller than the fertility change without FPP. The right panel proves the robustness of
the results.
Table 6 further shows how much percentage of fertility decline over cohorts can be ex-
plained by FPP.
[Table 6 is inserted here.]
Similar to Table 5, Table 6 consists of two panels. Take the left panel as an example. The
first row shows the predicted fertility of cohorts 1943 and 1960, based on the Column-
[1] regression of Table 3, and gives the fertility decline over cohorts, 1.95 (3.56−1.61).
Following the first row, the second row preserves the predicted fertility of cohort 1943,
but replaces the predicted fertility of cohort 1960 with the predicted fertility of cohort
1943 by setting the values of FPPj’s to be the same with those for cohort 1960. In other
words, the number 3.33 is the predicted fertility of cohort 1943 had they been exposed
to the FPP which cohort 1960 was actually exposed to. Therefore, 0.23 (3.56−3.33) is a
measure of fertility decline from cohort 1943 to 1960 attributed to the evolution of FPP,
and it accounts for about 11.8% (0.23/1.95× 100%) of the total decline.
As a comparison, the fourth row predicts the fertility of cohort 1943 by setting their years
of schooling to be the one of cohort 1960, to calculate what the fertility level of cohort
1943 would be had they received the same schooling with cohort 1960. The fertility
difference, 0.28 (3.56-3.28), is a measure of fertility decline over cohorts attributed to
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increasing schooling. It accounts for 14.4%, greater than the percentage associated with
FPP. Since the second and third rows are both based on cohort 1943, the fifth and sixth
rows are based on cohort 1960. In other words, it compares the predicted fertility of
cohort 1960 under their actual FPP exposure and the FPP exposure of cohort 1943.
Similar to Table 5, the right panel further proves the results are robust. Overall, FPP
accounts for about 10–13% of the fertility decline from cohort 1943 to 1960, while in-
creasing schooling can explain a bit more, about 14–16%. FPP and schooling together
can only explain about a quarter of the over-cohort fertility decline, leaving the rest three
quarters explained by other factors.
However, table 6 should be cautiously interpreted. First, since cohort 1943 was exposed
to some FPP (as shown in Figure 4), the percentage shown in Table 6 is associated
with part of but not the entire evolution of FPP. Nevertheless, FPP only accounts for
a small part of the biggest drop of cohort TFR in the data. Second, given the possible
underestimation of the coefficients of FPP related variables, the direction of bias for the
percentage in Table 6 is unclear. Unless the bias is negative and huge, the weak role that
FPP has played in the over-cohort fertility decline will not change.
Combining Tables 5 and 6, we can make up what would happen had there been no
FPP: the fertility levels of all cohorts of mothers will greatly shift up, but the downward
secular trend of fertility will certainly appear with declining rate not much slower than
the scenario with FPP.
5.4 Impact of family planning policy on women of different types
Section 5.2 has shown that women of different types, distinguished by urban/rural and
Han/non-Han, face different effects of FPP on fertility. This subsection further classifies
women according to their years of schooling, the gender of their first child, and whether
they reside in better-developed coastal provinces to reveal how the effect of FPP varies
along the new types. Table 7 presents subsample regressions for women of different types.
[Table 7 is inserted here.]
Columns [1] and [2] group women based on whether they received nine years of schooling.64
Columns [3] and [4] categorize women by the gender of their first child. Columns [5]
and [6] distinguish women by whether they live in coastal provinces of China.65 Model
specifications through all columns are identical to Column [1] of Table 3. The Chow test
strongly rejects equal coefficients of regressions between groups. Indeed, the coefficients,
in particular the coefficients of FPP related variables, seem different across groups.
64Nine years of schooling marks the graduation from junior high school and is also the current compulsory level
of schooling in China.
65Jiangsu, Liaoning and Shandong are identified as coastal provinces in the data.
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Table 8, derived from Table 7 using the same approach for Table 4, shows the partial
effect of FPP on fertility for each type of women. At first glance, Table 8 exhibits similar
patterns to Table 4. Regardless schooling, gender of the first child, and province of
living, the impact of FPP gets stronger along periods, with bigger effects for urban or
Han women than for rural or non-Han women within each period.
[Table 8 is inserted here.]
Additionally and more interestingly, less-educated women are more heavily impacted by
FPP. The reason could be that more-educated women tend to desire fewer children and
thus, face lighter shocks from FPP. Furthermore, a woman whose first child is a daughter
confronts greater impact from FPP compared to a woman whose first child is a son,
possibly because she tends to bear more children so as to eventually get a son, given
the deep-rooted son preference in China. Finally, women from coastal provinces are less
affected by FPP, probably because coastal provinces represent better-developed areas in
China and people residing there tend to desire fewer children.
5.5 Impact of family planning policy on the age of first marriage
According to the history, other than influencing the childbearing behaviors of married
women, FPP may also play a significant role in the decision of marriage age. Table 9
assesses how the probability of getting married by some age responds to the presence of
FPP.
[Table 9 is inserted here.]
The dependent variables are dummies indicating whether a woman’s age of first marriage
was below some level. Logit models are used through all columns, with the same set
of independent variables as in Column [1] of Table 3. Marginal effects and their robust
standard errors are reported.
Table 10, derived from Table 9, reports the odds ratio of being married over being unmar-
ried by some age for some group of women who are fully exposed to some single period
of FPP (left panel), and the change in odds ratio over periods of FPP (right panel).
[Table 10 is inserted here.]
Take the numbers corresponding to “Urban non-Han” and “≤ 22” as an example. The
odds ratio of being married over being unmarried by age 22 for an urban non-Han woman
who has never been exposed to any FPP is 220.28; while if she has ever been fully exposed
to the period-2 FPP (but not exposed to the period-1 or period-3 FPP), her odds ratio
will fall to 3.26. The right panel accordingly shows the full exposure to (only) the period-
2 FPP will make the odds ratio of being married over being unmarried a fraction 0.01
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(3.26/220.28) of the odds ratio in the absence of FPP. Non-FPP variables take the mean
values within that group of women.
Table 10 shows the following patterns. First, in the left panel, given a group of women
and a period of FPP, the odds ratio of being married over being unmarried increases as
the reference age of marriage rises. Second, in the left panel, given a group of women and
a reference age of marriage, the odds ratio decreases from Period 1 to Period 3, implying
that marriage is more likely to be delayed if the FPP is more strongly enforced. Third,
in the left panel, given a reference age of marriage and a period of FPP, urban women
have smaller odds ratio than rural women, while the results between Han and non-Han
women are mixed. Fourth, in the right panel, given a group of women and a specific
ratio of odds ratios, the impact of FPP on marriage delay is stronger for the women who
initially got married later.
6 Sensitivity of Results to Alternative Measures
6.1 Construct measures using different probability distributions of child-
bearing age
The measure of FPP used for the above analysis is constructed based upon the probability
distribution of childbearing age of all women in the data, as shown in Figure 3. However,
the distribution may have been shaped by the FPP. The ideal distribution, the pre-FPP
distribution, can not be derived from the data, but it is feasible to check the sensitivity
of the results to the usage of different distributions.
Figure 6 shows separately the distributions of childbearing age for urban Han, rural
Han, urban non-Han, and rural non-Han women and Figure 7 shows the distributions for
women of cohort 1931–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, and 1971–1991, respectively.
[Figure 6 and 7 are inserted here.]
Women across groups have similar distributions, while women of different cohorts clearly
diverge in the distribution. In particular, older cohorts of women have flatter distribu-
tions, implying active childbearing through all ages. Table 11 shows the regression results
using the measures of FPP constructed on different distributions of childbearing age.
[Table 11 is inserted here.]
Column [1] is the base regression, identical to the Column [1] of Table 3. Through
Columns [2] to [9], the measures of FPP are constructed based upon different distributions
of childbearing age, as shown in Figure 6 and 7. The results support strong robustness of
almost all coefficients over columns. Table 12 further calculates the partial effect of FPP
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for all columns with the top panel, for reference, identical to panel 1 of Table 4. Clearly,
the partial effects are robust, as well.
[Table 12 is inserted here.]
6.2 Use measures lacking heterogeneity, or incomplete or endogenous mea-
sures
As Section 1 states, the discord of results between this paper and other papers may
originate from the usage of different measures of FPP or reasons other than measurement,
such as the choice of data set or model specification. This subsection answers to what
extent different measurement of FPP will lead to different estimations of the partial effect
of FPP on fertility, given all the other factors fixed.
Table 13 shows the regressions using measures of FPP lacking heterogeneity or exogeneity.
Column [1] is still the base regression. Columns [2] and [3] use the following formula for





49− 15 + 1 , (10)
which essentially treats f(age) in equation (7) as a uniform distribution over [15, 49]. For
the great famine exposures and pre-PRC period exposure, Column [2] still uses formula
(7), while Column [3] adopts formula (10).
[Table 13 is inserted here.]
Columns [4] and [5] define FPPj as a dummy variable: whether a woman gave birth to
a child during the period-j FPP. Similarly, Column [4] uses formula (7) to define great
famine and pre-PRC exposures, while Column [5] uses formula (10).
Although most FPP related interactions through Columns [2] to [5] have strongly negative
coefficients, the FPPj’s themselves exhibit big and strong positive effects on fertility.
Table 14 further shows the partial effect, and apparently, after losing heterogeneity and
exogeneity, the effect of FPP on fertility gets reversed.66
[Table 14 is inserted here.]
Finally, Table 15 shows what would happen if only a part of the FPP variations are
considered for measurement. Table 16 calculates the partial effect of FPP based on Table
15.
66This result appears with the data and model specification of this paper. It can not be naturally generalized
to other data and specifications.
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[Tables 15 and 16 are inserted here.]
Column [1] is the base regression. Column [2] omits the period-1 FPP, and Column [3]
ignores both the period-1 and period-2 FPP. Table 16 shows that Columns [2] and [3]
regressions do not only neglect the effect of FPP that is excluded, but also systematically
underestimate the effect of FPP that is included.
Column [4] ignores the cross-sectional policy variation between Han and non-Han women,
and Column [5] drops the policy variation between urban and rural areas. Partial effects
for these two columns do not deviate much from the top panel, but sacrifice the Han/non-
Han and urban/rural effect variations.
Columns [6] to [9] ignore both the secular and cross-sectional policy variations, and
result in the partial effects involving both underestimation and lack of cross-sectional
variations.
7 Conclusions and Further Study
FPP in China has been widely studied yet its impact on fertility is under debate. Many
papers have concluded that FPP explains a sizable portion of China’s fertility decline,
while others have argued that the role of China’s FPP in population control has been
overstated.
One reason is the different measures of FPP, which might not only lead to various effects
on fertility, but could also cause indefinite second-stage results in studies where FPP
is treated as an instrumental variable. Roughly, FPP can be measured by specific or
constructed variables. The former comes from specific information on FPP of some spe-
cific data sets, such as the availability of family planning services, monetary penalties on
“over-quota” births, and subsidies for one-child families. The latter, more widely used,
is relatively easier to construct and relies on the history of FPP. However, most exist-
ing measures fail to completely capture policy variations, insufficiently express people’s
heterogeneous exposures to FPP, and sometimes, suffer from endogeneity.
This paper tries to construct a new measure of FPP that can improve on the above three
aspects. Historically, FPP varies over time and differs between urban and rural areas
and between Han and non-Han people. The measure adopted in the study embodies the
secular and cross-sectional policy variations as completely as possible. The basic idea of
constructing the new measure comes from the intuition that a woman is more likely to
be affected by the FPP of some period if she is more physiologically capable to bear a
child during the period. The method of constructing the new measure implies a progress
in heterogeneity and exogeneity.
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A cross-sectional data of the CHNS is used to construct the measure and to estimate the
impact of FPP on the number of children ever born to a ever-married woman and on the
probability of early marriage. First, the empirical analysis supports the appropriateness of
the newly constructed measure because its empirical features well fit the history. Second,
based on the new measure, FPP can explain a sizable fertility level shift for all cohorts,
but can only explain a small portion of the fertility decline over cohorts. Third, the age
of first marriage tends to be largely delayed under FPP, particularly when it is strongly
enforced. Fourth, the women who are more educated, living in more-developed coastal
provinces, or whose first child is a son, tend to desire fewer children and face fewer
restrictions from FPP.
The study also has some limitations. First, FPP differs cross provinces. Since little
information on the provincial-level policy variations is available, only variations across
urban/rural and Han/non-Han are considered. Second, the sample used in the paper
might have problems of reliability for older generations. Third, income is not controlled
in regressions due to its endogeneity and measurement problem. However, it may simul-
taneously lead to an omitted variable bias, even though many other variables have been
included. Last but not least, a more general form, rather than a quasi-separable form, is
desirable to measure the FPP.
Several directions can be further explored. First, the paper analyzes the impact of FPP
on the total number of children ever born up to the survey. It could be more precise to
observe the dynamic effects of FPP of some period on the childbearing behavior in that
specific period. Second, a thorough review on how different measures of FPP could affect
second stage regression results could be done.
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Figure 1: Urban and rural total fertility rates over time
The overall total fertility rate is cited from Yang (2004, pp. 264–265), and urban and rural total fertility
rates are cited from Yang (2004, pp. 134, 135, 139). All figures originally come from various national
surveys conducted by China’s statistical authority. The left, middle and right dashed lines mark the
years of 1963, 1971 and 1980, segmenting the entire history into four periods.
Figure 2: Han and non-Han total fertility rates over time
The overall total fertility rate is cited from Yang (2004, pp. 264–265). The Han (ethnic majority) and
non-Han (ethnic minority) total fertility rates are cited from Yang (2004, pp. 145, 150). All figures
originally come from various national surveys conducted by China’s statistical authority. The left and
right dashed lines mark the years of 1971 and 1980, the starting points of the period 2 and 3 family
planning policies.
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Figure 3: Probability distribution of childbearing age
The probability of childbearing at an age is calculated as the ratio of the total number of children born
to the women at that age and the total number of children ever born in the entire data. The distribution
takes positive values though age 15 to 49, and 0 for other ages. Clearly, probabilities sum up to 1.
Figure 4: Exposure to family planning policy over cohort
The exposure to the three periods of family planning policies are calculated based on equation (3).
Clearly, the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s cohorts are mostly exposed to the period-1, period-2 and period-3
policy, respectively. For the one-child policy is ongoing, the interval exposed to it for the younger cohorts
is the interval through age 15 (or the age at which they started to be affected by the policy) to the age
at the latest interview.
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Figure 5: Total fertility rate over cohorts
For each cohort of mothers, the fertility rate is the summation of average number of children born
at each mother’s age through 15 to 49 for that cohort. Because the women born after 1960 had not
physiologically completed childbearing by the last wave 2009, Figure 5 only ranges from cohort 1931 to
1960.
Figure 6: Probability distribution of childbearing age for different groups of women
The approach of deriving the distributions is the same with Figure 3, just replacing the whole sample of
women with a specific subgroup of women.
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Figure 7: Probability distribution of childbearing age for different cohorts of women
The approach of deriving the distributions is the same with Figure 3, just replacing the whole sample of























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Descriptive statistics of selected variables
Full Subsample by cohort
sample 1931–40 1941–50 1951–60 1961–70 1971–80 1981–91
# of children ever born
Mean 1.76 1.72 3.01 2.01 1.49 1.23 0.75
[1.12] [1.10] [1.40] [1.05] [0.78] [0.64] [0.61]
0 (%) 4.33 0.38 0.45 0.91 3.52 6.34 33.73
[20.35] [6.14] [6.67] [9.49] [18.44] [24.38] [47.35]
1 (%) 46.37 55.09 11.62 35.15 54.77 68.81 57.61
[49.87] [49.83] [32.06] [47.76] [49.78] [46.35] [49.49]
2 (%) 29.80 28.30 27.04 37.71 32.83 21.18 8.36
[45.74] [45.13] [44.44] [48.48] [46.97] [40.88] [27.72]
3 (%) 12.32 10.94 29.61 18.29 7.33 3.17 0.30
[32.87] [31.28] [45.68] [38.67] [26.06] [17.53] [5.46]
> 3 (%) 7.180 5.280 31.28 7.95 1.55 0.50 0.00
[25.82] [22.41] [46.39] [27.06] [12.36] [7.06] [0.00]
% sons 52.22 52.63 50.61 51.61 53.23 54.31 52.38
[49.95] [49.99] [50.01] [49.98] [49.90] [49.83] [50.04]
Age at first marriage 22.32 24.09 21.53 23.17 22.02 22.42 21.39
[3.22] [10.14] [3.98] [3.19] [2.75] [2.84] [2.28]
Urban (%) 34.13 26.79 32.29 38.05 35.98 30.69 24.78
[47.42] [44.37] [46.78] [48.56] [48.01] [46.14] [43.24]
Han (%)
woman 87.59 82.64 86.15 89.10 89.24 84.57 87.76
[32.97] [37.95] [34.57] [31.18] [30.99] [36.14] [32.82]
husband 88.05 84.62 85.85 88.97 89.67 85.91 87.65
[32.44] [36.25] [34.88] [31.34] [30.45] [34.80] [32.95]
Years of schooling
woman 7.98 2.73 5.28 7.54 9.12 9.30 9.76
[3.82] [3.67] [3.68] [4.01] [3.02] [2.91] [2.73]
husband 9.30 6.40 7.49 9.17 9.90 9.76 10.11
[3.13] [3.93] [3.61] [3.18] [2.77] [2.66] [2.38]
Age at survey
woman 42.51 70.49 49.63 48.16 40.00 32.23 24.42
[10.66] [6.69] [5.02] [5.15] [6.35] [4.16] [2.51]
husband 43.32 67.96 50.96 49.84 41.60 34.07 26.88
[10.02] [10.83] [5.43] [5.87] [7.01] [5.13] [3.80]
Province (%)
Gaungxi 11.97 16.98 12.07 10.85 11.23 12.68 15.82
[32.46] [37.62] [32.59] [31.11] [31.58] [33.29] [36.55]
Guizhou 12.04 23.77 14.64 10.96 9.68 14.18 8.96
[32.55] [42.65] [35.37] [31.25] [29.57] [34.90] [28.60]
Heilongjiang 8.66 0.00 3.69 8.63 10.47 11.18 8.36
[28.12] [0.00] [18.86] [28.09] [30.63] [31.52] [27.72]
Henan 12.79 16.98 13.07 10.68 12.87 14.01 14.93
[33.40] [37.62] [33.73] [30.89] [33.49] [34.73] [35.69]
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Full Subsample by cohort
sample 1931–40 1941–50 1951–60 1961–70 1971–80 1981–91
Hubei 10.05 7.17 11.17 9.65 10.94 9.34 8.36
[30.08] [25.85] [31.52] [29.54] [31.23] [29.11] [27.72]
Hunan 10.98 10.94 9.39 12.15 10.43 10.59 14.03
[31.27] [31.28] [29.18] [32.68] [30.57] [30.79] [34.78]
Jiangsu 11.56 6.04 14.53 10.56 11.41 11.51 14.33
[31.97] [23.86] [35.26] [30.74] [31.81] [31.93] [35.09]
Liaoning 11.50 6.42 9.83 14.48 12.54 8.26 9.25
[31.90] [24.55] [29.79] [35.20] [33.13] [27.53] [29.02]
Shandong 10.45 11.70 11.62 12.04 10.43 8.26 5.97
[30.59] [32.20] [32.06] [32.55] [30.57] [27.53] [23.73]
Year of survey (%)
1991 4.24 6.04 11.40 3.69 4.32 0.33 0.00
[20.15] [23.86] [31.79] [18.86] [20.34] [5.77] [0.00]
1993 13.35 5.66 53.30 10.16 8.83 1.67 0.00
[34.01] [23.15] [49.92] [30.23] [28.38] [12.81] [0.00]
2000 12.36 1.13 27.93 17.26 8.03 7.09 0.30
[32.92] [10.60] [44.89] [37.80] [27.19] [25.68] [5.46]
2004 6.42 0.00 0.22 9.37 5.73 10.18 3.58
[24.52] [0.00] [4.72] [29.15] [23.25] [30.24] [18.61]
2006 18.06 0.38 0.11 37.88 12.35 16.93 16.12
[38.47] [6.14] [3.34] [48.52] [32.91] [37.52] [36.83]
2009 45.57 86.79 7.04 21.64 60.73 63.80 80.00
[49.81] [33.92] [25.59] [41.19] [48.85] [48.08] [40.06]
Observations 6584 265 895 1761 2129 1199 335




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Partial effects of family planning policy on fertility
Panel 1. Derived from regression [1]
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Great famine
Urban Han -0.88*** -1.56*** -1.52***
-0.59
Rural Han -0.50 -0.82*** -1.08***
Urban Non-Han -0.92** -1.09*** -1.17***
Rural Non-Han -0.57 -0.35 -0.73***
Panel 2. Derived from regression [2]
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Great famine
Urban Han -0.87*** -1.57*** -1.52***
-0.58
Rural Han -0.50 -0.81*** -1.07***
Urban Non-Han -1.02** -0.91*** -1.08***
Rural Non-Han -0.52 -0.38 -0.76***
Panel 3. Derived from regression [3]
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Great famine
Urban Han -0.85** -1.36*** -1.32***
-0.99
Rural Han -0.56 -0.94*** -1.09***
Urban Non-Han -1.27*** -1.12*** -1.17***
Rural Non-Han -1.03** -0.71*** -0.93***
Three panels represent the partial effects of FPP on fertility derived from Columns [1]-[3] of Table
3. In each panel, women are categorized and the entire period of FPP is segmented, as in Table 1.
Along each group (row), the number below “Period j” (j = 1, 2, 3) indicates the change in fertility
of a woman in that group if she had been fully exposed to the period-j FPP, keeping other factors
constant. For example, in Panel 1, the number -0.82, corresponding to “Rural Han” and “Period 2”,
means a rural Han woman would have 0.82 fewer children if she had been fully exposed to the period-2
FPP, keeping all the other variables constant. The number -0.82 is calculated in the following way:( − 0.471 + (−0.631)) ×max(FPP2|Durban = 0, DHan = 1) = ( − 0.471 + (−0.631)) × 0.745 = −0.82,
where -0.471 and -0.631 are the coefficients of FPP2 and DHan×FPP2, and 0.745 is the maximum value
of FPP2 for the rural Han women. In Panel 2, the calculation considers the three-term interactions, and
in Panel 3, the FPP variables involving husbands’s information are taken into account for calculation.
For comparison, the average partial effect of the great famine on fertility is also listed for each panel,
using a similar method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Percentage change of fertility explained by family planning policy within each cohort






















1943 3.56 4.46 25.3 67 3.56 4.46 25.3 67
1944 3.44 4.35 26.5 60 3.44 4.35 26.5 60
1945 3.16 4.24 34.2 83 3.16 4.24 34.2 83
1946 3.09 4.26 37.9 106 3.09 4.26 37.9 106
1947 3.00 4.19 39.7 92 3.00 4.17 39.0 80
1948 2.91 4.05 39.2 113 2.92 4.04 38.4 99
1949 2.67 3.94 47.6 137 2.64 3.92 48.5 102
1950 2.54 3.87 52.4 114 2.52 3.86 53.2 90
1951 2.45 3.78 54.3 164 2.47 3.78 53.0 135
1952 2.34 3.69 57.7 159 2.34 3.67 56.8 141
1953 2.16 3.47 60.6 186 2.19 3.48 58.9 158
1954 2.11 3.43 62.6 211 2.14 3.45 61.2 184
1955 2.04 3.33 63.2 183 2.09 3.36 60.8 157
1956 2.03 3.29 62.1 207 2.07 3.31 59.9 164
1957 1.93 3.19 65.3 188 1.98 3.23 63.1 151
1958 1.69 2.96 75.1 177 1.70 2.98 75.3 150
1959 1.71 2.94 71.9 142 1.80 3.03 68.3 106
1960 1.61 2.83 75.8 144 1.66 2.88 73.5 108






















1943–60 2.31 2.71 17.3 2533 2.36 2.75 16.5 2141
The left panel uses all the women of cohorts 1943–1960, while the right panel is only based on the women of
cohorts 1943–1960 who were 45 or above at survey. In each panel, the first column of numbers represent
the predicted fertility for each cohort from the Column-[1] regression of Table 3. The second column
records the predicted fertility by setting all FPP related variables to be 0. In other words, the second
column shows the predicted fertility for each cohort of women had they never been exposed to FPP. The
third column calculates the fertility increase from the first to the second column in percentage. As a
comparison, this table also shows the predicted fertility if the years of schooling is 0, and calculates the
percentage change of fertility attributed to schooling.
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Table 6: Percentage of fertility decline over explained by family planning policy























































































1.92 1.61 0.31 [15.9%] 1.96 1.66 0.30 [15.8%]
Like Table 5, Table 6 consists of two panels. Take the left panel as an example. The first row shows
the predicted fertility of cohort 1943 and 1960, based on the Column-[1] regression of Table 3, and gives
the fertility decline over cohorts, 1.95 (3.56−1.61). Following the first row, the second row preserves the
predicted fertility of cohort 1943, but replaces the predicted fertility of cohort 1960 with the predicted
fertility of cohort 1943 by setting the values of FPPj ’s to be the same with those for cohort 1960. In
other words, the number 3.33 is the predicted fertility of cohort 1943 had they been exposed to the
FPP which cohort 1960 was actually exposed to. Therefore, 0.23 (3.56−3.33) is a measure of fertility
decline from cohort 1943 to 1960 attributed to the evolution of FPP, and it accounts for about 11.8%
(0.23/1.95× 100%) of the total decline. As a comparison, the fourth row predicts the fertility of cohort
1943 by setting their years of schooling to be the one of cohort 1960, to calculate what the fertility level
of cohort 1943 would be had they received the same schooling with cohort 1960. The fertility difference,
0.28 (3.56-3.28), is a measure of fertility decline over cohorts attributed to increasing schooling. It
accounts for 14.4%, greater than the percentage associated with FPP. Since the second and third rows
are both based on cohort 1943, the fifth and sixth rows are based on cohort 1960. Namely, it compares










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Partial effects of family planning policy on fertility for women of different types
Panel 1
Years of schooling Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Urban Han < 9 -1.48*** -1.79*** -1.72***
>= 9 0.42 -0.72*** -0.70***
Rural Han < 9 -1.16** -1.24*** -1.40***
>= 9 0.98 -0.13 -0.28
Urban Non-Han < 9 -1.16** -1.42*** -1.18***
>= 9 -0.30 -0.59 -1.01***
Rural Non-Han < 9 -0.88 -0.86** -0.86***
>= 9 0.23 0.01 -0.59**
Panel 2
Gender of first child Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Urban Han Son -0.99** -1.76*** -1.93***
Daughter -1.56*** -2.24*** -2.32***
Rural Han Son -0.61 -1.08*** -1.44***
Daughter -1.00** -1.37*** -1.51***
Urban Non-Han Son -1.00* -1.10*** -1.39***
Daughter -1.63*** -2.12*** -2.19***
Rural Non-Han Son -0.65 -0.42 -0.90***
Daughter -1.13** -1.24*** -1.38***
Panel 3
Province Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Urban Han Costal -0.59 -1.08*** -1.18***
Non-coastal -1.13*** -1.88*** -1.78***
Rural Han Costal -0.18 -0.29 -0.66***
Non-coastal -0.74* -1.14*** -1.32***
Urban Non-Han Costal 0.38 -0.37 -0.58
Non-coastal -1.41*** -1.59*** -1.60***
Rural Non-Han Costal 0.74 0.36 -0.05
Non-coastal -1.06** -0.85** -1.13***
Calculation approach is similar to that for Table 4. Just need to replace the sample maximum of FPPj
with subsample maximum of FPPj . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Regressions of marriage age on family planning policy
[1] Dep. var. = 1
If age at first mar-
riage ≤ 20
[2] Dep. var. = 1
If age at first mar-
riage ≤ 22
[3] Dep. var. = 1
If age at first mar-
riage ≤ 24
FPP1 0.093 -0.705 -0.855**
[0.356] [0.520] [0.410]
FPP2 -0.232 -1.200*** -1.467***
[0.222] [0.320] [0.254]
FPP3 -0.704*** -1.411*** -1.359***
[0.136] [0.206] [0.187]
Durban × FPP1 0.248* -0.143 0.188
[0.145] [0.199] [0.151]
Durban × FPP2 0.043 -0.203 0.119
[0.113] [0.146] [0.110]
Durban × FPP3 0.136* 0.038 0.213**
[0.070] [0.098] [0.083]
DHan × FPP1 0.514*** 1.119*** 0.399
[0.191] [0.302] [0.259]
DHan × FPP2 0.395*** 0.717*** 0.276
[0.147] [0.233] [0.185]
DHan × FPP3 0.254*** 0.541*** 0.347**
[0.090] [0.155] [0.148]
Durban -0.142 0.172 -0.207
[0.122] [0.169] [0.168]
DHan -0.665*** -0.569*** -0.219***
[0.159] [0.053] [0.054]
Years of schooling -0.037*** -0.047*** -0.024***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Demeaned years of schooling2/2 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Age at survey 0.006** 0.012*** 0.009***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Demeaned age at survey2/2 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Exposure to famine period -1.401 -2.374 -0.220
[1.563] [2.134] [1.365]
Exposure to post-famine period 1.310 -0.017 -1.807
[1.464] [2.235] [1.455]
Exposure to pre-PRC period 349.254 -46.147 560.783
[404.512] [638.417] [534.439]
Observations 6258 6143 6059
Pseudo R-squared 0.128 0.135 0.131
Chi-squared stat. for FPP 66.74 75.91 99.03
All coefficients are marginal effects. Robust standard errors are in squared brackets. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Model specifications are the same with Column [1] of Table 3. All p values






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13: Regressions with homogeneous or endogenous measures of family planning policy











FPP1 -0.814 3.410** 4.937*** 1.011*** 1.006***
[0.576] [1.417] [1.472] [0.136] [0.133]
FPP2 -0.471 4.879*** 5.759*** 0.852*** 0.855***
[0.350] [0.998] [1.004] [0.124] [0.120]
FPP3 -0.733*** 5.085*** 5.006*** 1.001*** 1.006***
[0.224] [0.492] [0.463] [0.089] [0.088]
Durban × FPP1 -0.547** -1.341** -1.297** -0.018 -0.005
[0.245] [0.546] [0.547] [0.108] [0.105]
Durban × FPP2 -0.991*** -2.047*** -2.051*** 0.016 0.007
[0.144] [0.361] [0.360] [0.078] [0.078]
Durban × FPP3 -0.443*** -0.686*** -0.688*** -0.144** -0.151**
[0.099] [0.123] [0.123] [0.065] [0.065]
DHan × FPP1 0.101 0.652 0.664 0.276* 0.248*
[0.400] [0.935] [0.933] [0.146] [0.141]
DHan × FPP2 -0.631*** -1.582*** -1.574*** -0.071 -0.032
[0.220] [0.611] [0.610] [0.126] [0.123]
DHan × FPP3 -0.350** -0.526** -0.507** -0.085 -0.086
[0.153] [0.215] [0.213] [0.093] [0.091]
Durban 0.071 0.726*** 0.723*** -0.546*** -0.528***
[0.150] [0.229] [0.229] [0.113] [0.112]
DHan 0.419* 0.790** 0.774** 0.072 -0.009
[0.252] [0.393] [0.390] [0.191] [0.183]
Years of schooling -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.051*** -0.050***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Demeaned years of schooling2/2 -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Age at survey 0.119 -0.166* -0.165 0.148* 0.123
[0.100] [0.099] [0.102] [0.087] [0.080]
Demeaned age at survey2/2 -0.011*** 0.002 0.001 -0.009*** -0.007**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Exposure to famine period -1.828 -1.630* 5.156** -3.187*** 0.633**
[1.343] [0.984] [2.135] [0.884] [0.269]
Exposure to post-famine period -1.604 3.632 -1.397 4.984*** 1.083***
[2.678] [2.570] [3.962] [1.758] [0.179]
Exposure to pre-PRC period 25.200 -52.98 -2.880 -145.607***
[48.863] [48.836] [3.259] [50.023]
Constant -2.034 10.605** 9.359* -5.265 -5.097
[5.547] [5.379] [5.671] [4.799] [4.441]
Observations 6533 6533 6533 6533 6533
R-squared 0.507 0.511 0.511 0.591 0.603
F stat. for FPP 13.89 19.43 22.02 115.40 119.40
Robust standard errors are in squared brackets. ***, p<.01; **, p<.05; *, p<.1. Model specifications are
the same with Column [1] of Table 3. Column [1] is the base regression. Column [2] and [3] use formula
(10) for FPPj(c, t). For the great famine exposures and pre-PRC period exposure, Column [2] still uses
formula (7), while Column [3] adopts formula (10). Column [4] and [5] define FPPj as a dummy variable
whether a woman gave birth to a child during the period-j FPP. Similarly, Column [4] uses formula (7)
to define great famine and pre-PRC exposures, while Column [5] uses formula (10).
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